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ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE FOUND BY 
MARIJUANA DETECTION DOGS 
By: Captain Fredric I. Lederer, AJGC, Fort Gordon, Georgia, and 
Second Lieutenant Calvin M. Lederer, QMjJAGC, Hofstra University Law School 
Just as the attention of the public has be-
come increasingly centered on the illicit drug 
trade so have law enforcement agents intensi-
fied their efforts to cope with the traffic. One 
of the more effective instruments developed to 
detect hidden drugs and deter drug abuse has 
been the dog. Dogs 1 have been trained 2 
within the Department of Defense 3 to detect 
marijuana and heroin. It is the purpose of 
this article to discuss in brief the difficulties 
such searches raise when the prosecution at-
tempts to have the resulting evidence admitted 
at trial and to proffer some suggestions for 
both defense and trial counsel involved in a 
marijuana 4 dog case. At the outset it should 
be noted that there is a paucity of cases in-
volving narcotics detection dogs.n 
The typical barracks G dog search approxi-
mates the following pattern: A commander-
frequently at brigade level-will arrange for 
a detector dog and handler (usually under the 
control of the PMO) to search a unit. The 
decision to search may be made alone or in 
conjunction with a subordinate commander. 
The dog and handler are then transported 
unannounced to the unit where the barracks 
are either emptied of personnel and guards 
posted, or the unit members are ordered to 
stand by their bunks and lockers. Somewhat 
obviously, the former is to be preferred if the 
purpose of the search is examination of the 
barracks and lockers. The dog is walked 
through the barracks guided by the handler-
the importance of whose activities cannot be 
overemphasized. The dog should smell every-
thing in its path. While the dog may detect 
airborne scent and follow it to its source, more 
likely the dog will have to smell the immediate 
proximity of an area to detect marijuana 
within it. The dog will, when it believes it has 
located marijuana, "alert" to the substance by 
whining, :pawing the area, trying to play with 
the substance, and displaying similar actions. 
At this point, the officer accompanying the dog 
team will authorize seizure, or in the case of a 
container such as a wall locker, will authorize 
entry and search. 
Two threshold questions present them-
selves: is the given search one that is de-
pendent upon probable cause for legitimacy 
and, if so, who has actually authorized it? 
These questions are as old as the law of search 
and seizure but pose certain peculiarities in 
this context. A search of public property 7 
or open fields R does not require probable 
cause nor does seizure of contraband found in 
plain view.9 Yet - may a dog be walked 
through the middle of a barracks? In the 
broadest sense, the question is that of the 
reasonable expectation of privacy by the 
soldier billeted in the barracks. While he may 
not expect a dog, he is well aware that his 
quarters are for many purposes public and 
open to any member of the command as well 
as to numerous visitors. While the situation 
may differ slightly where barracks which are 
divided into rooms rather than bays, the ques-
tion is one of degree. It is suggested that 
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where the individual has no expectation of 
substantial privacy, no cause is necessary to 
walk the dog through the area, and any con-
traband found may be seized.10 The weight 
of the policy behind the military's drug sup-
pression program must be considered to be a 
primary factor involved in the determination 
not to expand the right of privacy in the mili-
tary in this setting. Such a determination 
has already been signaled by a military 
court.11 
On the other hand, intrusion into those 
areas normally considered private necessitates 
either probable cause or a shakedown inspec-
tion theory. Use of a dog would seem to 
nullify any attempt at explaining a search as 
a traditional shakedown inspection devoted to 
a unit's readiness or health and welfare. How-
ever, recent case law indicated that a shake-
down inspection may ordered for the express 
purpose of finding contraband such as illegal 
weapons and drugs,12 and that any contra-
band seized may be used in subsequent crimi-
nal prosecution. Accordingly, if every room 
and locker were shaken down as in a normal 
shakedown inspection and the dog was used 
simply to assist in the shakedown, probable 
cause, depending upon what the dog actually 
alerts to, might not be necessary to establish 
the legality of the search and subsequent 
seizure. Assuming that this theory fails or 
that the more normal and economical type of 
dog search (opening only those lockers and 
perhaps entering only those rooms the dog 
alerts to from the outside) is used, probable 
cause will be necessary 13 to secure admission 
of seized evidence at trial. 
If probable cause is necessary, the question 
of command authorization is raised. In the 
typical barracks dog search counsel will note 
that a distinct question may be raised as to 
which commander actually authorized the 
search. If the company commander was 
ordered to open any locker the dog alerted to, 
it is probable that the superior commander 
was the authorizing officer 14 and any founda-
tion to be laid in court to admit the evidence 
will, as will be discussed below, have to ex-
plore his knowledge of the dog's background. 
13 
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The issue will be one of the discretion avail-
able to the authorizing officer. In dog searches 
as in other search cases, the person authoriz-
ing a search must have the power to do so. 
Practical experience suggests that some com-
manders may erroneously believe they may 
delegate their powers to anyone in a most in-
formal manner when dogs are involved. While 
we are unaware of any dog case that involved 
search warrants, the question of the ability 
of a military judge to authorize search of an 
area or a container that a dog alerts to is ob-
vious and of great interest. 
The principal question in regard to mari-
juana dog use is: can a dog alone supply 
probable cause to search? When this question 
was first posed, the official response was a 
conservative (but hedged) no. 15 In light of 
recent case law the better answer would seem 
to be that the dogs can indeed supply probable 
cause. Only three military appellate cases 16 
have dealt with the question however briefly 
and indirectly. United States v. Unrue invol-
ved a marijuana dog search of a vehicle after 
it passed a road-block warning of search by 
narcotics dogs (an opportunity was supplied 
before search to drop any drugs into an "am-
nesty barrel") .n The dog alerted to the car 
and its five occupants were disembarked and 
apprehended. Subsequent body searches re-
vealed heroin in the possession of Unrue. The 
Court of Military Review held that the dog's 
alert was sufficient to supply probable cause 
to apprehend. The record of trial 18 indicates 
that the Brigade Commander who was held by 
the Court to have actually authorized the 
search (rather than the Brigade S-2 who was 
actually in charge of the operation and search) 
had observed the dog in action and was satis-
fied as to its reliability in the detection of 
marijuana. While the difference, if any, be-
tween probable cause to apprehend and prob-
able cause to search is unclear in this context 
(when the dog's alert indicates the probable 
immediate presence of seizable contraband) 
and not within the scope of this article, it 
seems unlikely that a standard of proof that 
justifies such a severe deprivation of liberty 
(apprehension) as well as subsequent search 
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based on the apprehension would be held less 
strict than a standard that justifies only in-
vasion of privacy. 
While the Air Force Court of Review in 
United States v. Ponder specifically did not 
decide the point, it stated (citing Wigmore's 
discussion of bloodhound evidence) HI that as-
suming arguendo a dog could supply probable 
cause, the dog would have to be shown to have 
been "well trained and well tested." ~ 0 The 
Court explicitly noted that a foundation of re-
liability was required to be shown before the 
court could proceed to consider the actual 
search. The Court further held that the dog's 
reliability had to be made known to the Com-
mander authorizing the search pTior to the 
authorization. In Pondet· the Commander's 
general knowledge of the dog training pro-
gram was held insufficient to justify the 
search. There is no reason to believe that 
knowledge of the mere fact that a dog has 
graduated from a military drug detection 
course will be held sufficient reason to accept 
a dog's reliability without further inquiry. In 
concept the closest thing to marijuana dog 
searches in prior law has been the use of 
bloodhound evidence. In the usual case the 
prosecution has sought to use the fact that a 
given individual was tracked by a dog to show 
the identity of the alleged perpetrator. The 
states have split 21 on the admissibility of 
such evidence with the majority of the South-
ern states accepting it. Those states that have 
rejected bloodhound evidence seem to have 
done so primarily on the grounds that a dog 
is inherently unreliable, and/or is in the posi-
tion of an expert witness who cannot be cross 
examined. A distrust of such evidence in view 
of the lack of scientific evidence to explain the 
sense of smell has also been evidenced. 22 Ex-
amination of the cases suggests that the pri-
mary reason why states have banned use of 
bloodhound evidence has been the fear that it 
unduly impresses juries which may rely on it 
to deprive a defendant of liberty or life. 
While of course the law of search and seizure's 
purpose may be said to protect the privacy of 
an individual against unreasonable invasion, 
clearly the consequences of the use of blood-
14 
hound evidence differ from those surrounding 
admission of evidence found by the marijuana 
detection dog. In the first, a man's liberty 
may depend solely on the actions of a dog that 
cannot be examined. In the second, the conse-
quence is simply a breach of privacy that leads 
to perfectly good evidence. If sufficient pre-
cautions can be taken to prevent unreasonable 
breaches of privacy, a balancing between the 
right to privacy, particularly as it exists in 
the military,23 against the current necessity 
to prevent drug use (particularly heroin traf-
fic) should yield a holding that evidence found 
by dogs is admissible. Such a balancing is, in 
practical terms, inescapable, and at least one 
military trial court has already indicated such 
thinking.~4 Certainly detection of a drug's 
odor by law enforcement agents has long been 
considered sufficient to supply probable cause 
to search. 25 What is involved here is only the 
expansion of the doctrine to a tool of law 
enforcement - a tool which experience has 
shown, when reasonable precautions are taken, 
to be an unusually effective one. 
The question must then be: what are rea-
sonable precautions? Such safeguards must 
be the laying of a foundation at trial that 
shows the dog is in fact reliable and that the 
commander or magistrate authorizing the 
search was aware prior to authorization of 
sufficient facts to convince him of the indi-
vidual dog's reliability. Such a test is akin 
to that necessary to legitimatize a search based 
on an informer's testimony or a search based 
on a mechanical detection instrument.26 In 
view of the bloodhound cases, it seems unlikely 
that a good faith reliance on erroneously 
stated evidence of reliability would support 
a commander's decision to search. 
To support the foundation suggested above, 
the following requirements should be met by 
commanders or judges before dog searches are 
authorized: 
(1) the commander or judge should be 
briefed in detail as to the general content 
of the marijauna detection dog course 
with emphasis placed on how the dog 
actually detects the drug; 
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(2) the commander or judge should be 
briefed by the dog handler (who should 
keep permanent records to supply the 
information) ~ 7 as to the training and 
performance of the actual dog to be used 
-both before graduation and during sub-
sequent live searches and practices. The 
handler should specify reliability in terms 
of the type of search (i.e. parcel, build-
ing, or vehicle) ; 
(3) if another individual is to conduct 
the search, instructions should be clear 
and preferably written. Where the intent 
is simply to send the dogs to a unit to be 
used as a subordinate may determine, it 
is essential that the subordinate's dis-
cretion be indicated. 
Counsel must bear in mind that investiga-
tion into the facts and background of a dog 
search must be thorough. Pitfalls for both 
prosecution and defense are numerous. The 
percentage reliability quoted by a dog handler 
is usually the number of "finds" of planted 
marijuana divided by the total number of 
"plants". It does NOT indicate the number 
of times the dog has falsely alerted in the 
absence of the drug. Since the dog will alert 
to the smell of a drug that has been removed 
from the area (dead scent) the handler may 
state that every alert of his dog is to past or 
present contraband. For Fourth Amendment 
purposes the ability of a dog to detect actual 
scent as compared with false alerts may be 
vital. The fact that a dog can find only 10 7r 
of planted material only indicates that per-
haps 90 '/o of contraband holders will escape 
detection. Since the fourth amendment pro-
tects privacy, one should be more concerned 
over how many innocent people will have their 
privacy invaded. Thus the percentage of 
"true" alerts to total alerts is important. This 
area has not been adequately explored in dog 
search cases. Similarly, what effect does the 
routine alert to dead scent have? Courts that 
have considered the question have not appar-
ently directed their attention to this matter 
either.28 If one must have probable cause to 
believe that contraband is at a given place 
nnw, as current case law requires, what effect 
does the dog's possible inability to distinguish 
and/or signal dead scent to its handler have? 
Counsel should be further cautioned to care-
15 
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fully examine the dog's training. A heroin 
detection dog, for example, may have been 
trained to detect materials used to cut heroin 
rather than to detect heroin proper. Every 
dog is trained to ignore detractors (i.e. noises, 
smells, etc.), artificial detractors (substances 
with smells similar to marijuana) and mask-
ing agents (substances such as perfume or 
gasoline which are used to mask the odor of 
the contraband) but the degree to which the 
dog has successfully completed such training 
will vary with the dog. Dogs generally have 
short attention spans and are greatly affected 
by certain working conditions. Contact with 
a dog's handler is essential to determine a 
dog's strengths and weaknesses. At the same 
time counsel should inquire into the back-
ground of the handler. It is not impossible for 
a handler unintentionally or otherwise to cue 
his dog to give an alert. 
Cases involving dog searches and indeed 
cases that involve animals generally may be 
expected to occur more frequently in the fu-
ture. They present a fascinating question as 
to the interaction between pressing social 
problems and the developing right to privacy. 
Footnotes 
1. While dogs of many breeds are used, the working 
breeds-particularly German Shepherds-seem to 
be preferred. 
2. See U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL FM 20-20 
BASIC TRAINING AND CARE OF MILITARY DOGS 
11972); CONARC PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION 830-
F6: Army RE>g. No. Hl0-12 (17 April 1970); U.S. 
ARMY MILITARY POLICE ScHOOL DEP'T OF SPECIAL-
IZED TRAINING, TRAINER'S GUIDE-MARIJUANA DE-
TECTOR DOGS. 
3. Arm~· Marijuana Detection Dogs (MDD) are pro-
cured b:v the USAF Base Procurement Office, 
Lackland AFB, Texas, and trained for thirteen 
weeks at the U.S. Armv Military Police School, 
Fort Gordon, GA. Handlers are volunteers from 
the 4th AIT Brigade, (MP), Fort Gordon, GA. 
4. Except where otherwise indicated, use of the term 
marijuana within this article will include heroin. 
Marijuana Detection Dogs without further train-
ing are unable to detect heroin. 
5. See United States v. Ponder, 45 C.M.R. 428 
(AFCMR), petition denied,-- U.S.C.M.A. --, 
45 C.M.R. 928 (1972); United States v. Unrue, 
72-16 JALS 3 (ACMR 1972); United States v. 
Smith,-- C.M.R. -- (NCMR 1972). Research, 
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including an Air Force LITE computer search, 
has failed to indicate other cases, military or 
civilian on point. We believe, however, that anum-
ber of special courts-martial have ruled on dog 
searches. See e.g. note 27 infra. 
6. Dogs may be used for virtually any type of search 
though the categories of building, vehicle, and 
parcel are often used. Believing that building 
searches generally present the most problems and 
subsume within them the problems presented by 
other types of searches, we have chosen to ad-
dress ourselves only to building searches. 
7. Cf. United States v. Weshenfelder, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 
416, 43 C.M.R. 256 (1971); Army Reg. No. 190-22, 
para. 2-2(d) (12 Jun 1970). 
8. See e.g. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED 
STATES, 1969 (Rev. ed.), para. 152; Hester v. 
United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924) but see United 
States v. Burnside, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 326, 35 C.M.R. 
298 (1965). In Dilger v. Commonwealth, 88 Ky. 
550, 11 S.W. 651 (1889), two policemen were 
walking by a building when they heard screams 
from inside the building. The policemen rushed in-
side and arrested the defendant, who had been 
beating his mistress. The Court upheld the arrest 
on the theory that the offense was committed in 
the officer's presence. The Court felt that the in-
formation gained through the sense of hearing 
justified the intrusion into the building. In Burn-
side, the Court assumed that the backyard was a 
protected curtilag-e but justified the officer's entry 
into the backyard on the basis of their plain view 
of stolen property in the back yard. Perhaps the 
Court would permit an intrusion into a protected 
area where the dog's alert in an unprotected, open 
area furnishes probable cause to believe that con-
traband is located in a protected area such as a 
footlocker. 
9. See e.g. United States v. Coleman, 32 C.M.R. 522 
(ABR 1962). 
10. Cf. United States v. Sumner, 34 C.M.R. 850 
(AFBR 1964); United States v. Ferrell, 41 C.M.R. 
452, 455 (ACMR 1969). 
11. See Memorandum Opinion of Colonel Reid W. 
Kennedy, Military Judge, in United States v. Un-
rue, GCM convened by the CG, 197th Infantry 
Brigade, Fort Benning, Georgia (filed 29 Nov 
1971). 
12. See Gilligan, Inspections, THE ARMY LAWYER, Vol. 
2, No. 11 (Nov 1972) at 11, and cases cited within. 
See generally Hunt, Inspections, 54 MIL. L. REV. 
225 (1971). 
13. Though unlikely in our opinion, we do not fore-
close the possibility of a form of implied consent 
if members of a unit are given advance warning 
of the future use of dogs. Of more interest is the 
16 
possibility of apprehension of an individual after 
a dog's alert and subsequent search pursuant to 
lawful apprehension. Sec United States v. Unrue, 
supra note 5. 
14. United States v. Unrue, supra note 5, at footnote 
3. 
15. DAJ A-MJ 1971/9121, 13 Oct. 1971. 
16. See note 5 supra. 
17. In view of the case's posture, consent to search 
was not at issue. 
18. Record, pp. 12, 13, United States v. Unrue, 12 
Nov 1971, as cited in Government Appellate Reply 
Brief. The Army Court of Military Review, 
though holding the officer conducting the search 
not to be a proper delegatee of the Commander's 
power to search, did not discuss this issue in its 
opinion. 
19. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 177. 
20. United States v. Ponder, 45 C.M.R. 428, 434 
(AFCMR 1972). 
21. See generally Annot., 18 A.L.R. 3d 1221 (1968). 
22. Query what effect odor detection devices developed 
for use in Vietnam may have. 
23. See e.g. Ally, Overseas Commander's Power to 
Regulate the Private Life, 37 MIL.L.REV. 57 
(1967); Murphy, The Soldier's Right to a Private 
Life, 24 MIL. L. REV. 97 (1964); Webster, The 
Citizen-Soldier in the Age of Aquarius: Does He 
Have a Private Life?, 27 JAG. J. 1 (1972). 
24. See note 11 supra. 
25. See e.g., McNeil, Recent Trends in Search and 
Seizw·e, 54 MIL. R. REV. 83, 93 and cases cited at 
note 39 (1971). 
26. A special court-martial tried at Fort Carson, 
Colorado, some two years ago, involved a mari-
juana dog search of a barracks divided into semi-
private rooms. The dog entered a room and alerted 
to a wall locker. The Commander, who had ac-
companied the search team, authorized search of 
the locker. Marijuana was found. The Military 
Judge at the subsequent trial denied the defense 
motion for appropriate relief to suppress the 
marijuana holding that the dog had in effect been 
shown to have been a reliable informant giving 
probable cause to search. The defendant was 
convictod (material courtesy of the Office of the 
SJ A, Fort Carson). See also note 11 supra. 
27. Army Reg. No. 190-12, para. 3-1 (d) (17 April 
1970). 
28. The facts in Unrue did not raise this point directly 
as the dog's reaction in that case was shown to be 
different to dead scent from its reaction to "live" 
scent. 
